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THE ANDEAN GROUP'S PROGRAM FOR INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT OF THE METALWORKING SECTOR:





About four and a half centuries ago, Pizarro took a scruffy band
of adventurers into the Peruvian Andes and through a series of unlikely
events and circumstances toppled the Inca Empire. Through military
strength, ingenuity, a highway system and astute administration of
politics and economics, the Incas had accomplished what their Spanish
and Creole successors have often desired, but never attained: a stable
integrated economic unit extending over the better part of the Andean
mountain range and its environs.' Recent events probably have brought
the modern day nations that occupy the same area closer to recapturing
the Inca unity than ever before.
The focus for such hope is the Andean Group, a common enterprise
of six countries running down the western coast of South America from
Venezuela to Chile, formalized by the 1969 Acuerdo de Cartagena signed
in Colombia.2
The Andean Group is directly related to the Latin American Free
Trade Association (LAFTA), being constituted as a subregional structure
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within LAFTA's regional framework.' The Cartagena Agreement has
profited from the problems of LAFTA. The Andean Group is formulated
to become a common market. Its basic document provides for subregional
trade liberalization, a common outer tariff, harmonization of laws and
policies, and guarantees that all members will be equitably served by
the process.4 Schedules and deadlines are complete and definite in the
basic pact,5 and have been met for the most part, although the late entry
of Venezuela in 1973 has caused some alterations and delays. 6 Current
political unrest in some of the Andean Group countries, particularly
as manifested by the attitude of the Chilean Junta toward the sub-
regional program, threatens serious disruption and further delay.
7
Still, unless it comes completely apart, by the early 1980's most of the
subregional program should be operative, with final conformation com-
plete by 1990. The highest authority in the Andean Group is its Com-
mission, made up of one cabinet-level representative from each country,
whose "decisions" are the fundamental norms of the system after the
Cartagena Agreement.' A permanent three-member Junta, based with its
staff in Lima, has been chiefly responsible for policy formulation and
should take increasing responsibility for implementation and execution
of the Commission-approved programs.9 The Junta acts through "resolu-
tions," and is responsible for proposing and drafting the Commission's
decisions.10
Whatever adjunct concerns it may manifest, the principal objective
of the Andean Group is to bind participant countries into an economic
development unit and achieve a modern industrialized society in common.
This is an ambitious goal, and while the Andean Group has achieved an
auspicious start the real acid test of its viability is at hand. The true
measure of the integration effort embodied in the Acuerdo may be found
in its sectorial programs of industrial development (SPID).11 This article
will develop that proposition and hopefully reveal some measure of the
Andean Group's prospects by analyzing the only SPID as yet approved
by vote of the Commission, the metalworking program set up by Decision
No. 57 of 20 August 1972.12
I. LAFTA AND CACM, PRECURSORS TO THE
ANDEAN GROUP AND SPID
To understand the Andean Group and its SPID mechanism, a
knowledge of the failing attempts at economic integration in the Latin
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American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) and the Central American
Common Market (CACM) is probably necessary. 13
A. Latin American Free Trade Association
1. LAFTA's Basic Scheme. In its expression of general principles
and intentions there is not much to fault in the Treaty of Montevideo.
From the preamble to the end, the document which created LAFTA is
shot through with concern for the economic development of all participant
countries, with awareness of the "special situation of relatively less
developed countries" 14 within the group, and with a positive attitude
toward the planning and coordination of production throughout the free-
trade zone. 15 Laudable expressions of concerns and intentions are no
better than their practical application, however, and if agreement on
guiding principles was simple, it proved a commodity which was more
difficult to obtain when the question of specific institutions, mechanisms,
and obligations was at issue.
Essentially a scheme of multilateral tariff reduction, LAFTA worked
reasonably well in extending concessions or preferences, some of which
already had been granted in bilateral treaties, for products traditionally
traded among most member states, and particularly among those of the
Southern Cone. The Treaty of Montevideo provided for two primary
methods of tariff reduction: (1) an annual conference to engage in
bilateral negotiations resulting in a National List of tariff concessions;16
and (2) at three-year intervals beginning in 1964, irrevocable agreement
by all LAFTA members on a Common List of items representing 25% of
the volume of intra-LAFTA commerce, "substantially all" of which was
to be placed in free trade at the end of the fourth common-list session in
1973.17 A secondary (at least in the sense that there was no provision
for specific or periodic obligations under its aegis) method of negotiated
tariff reductions were complementation agreements." In this form, several
participant countries could join in duty-free exchange of parts and inputs
involved in the production of a given manufactured product or product
line, which would then be traded duty-free among the participating
countries.
2. LAFTA's Shortcomings. The Treaty of Montevideo's concentra-
tion on removing tariff barriers created a situation in which the rich,
or most developed, heavyweights - Brazil, Mexico, Argentina - got richer,
the middleweights - Chile, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, Uruguay - got
poorer, and the lightweights - Ecuador, Bolivia, Paraguay - lagged pain-
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fully behind. Ultimately the inflexibility of those benefitted towards the
initiatives for change on the part of other member states was more
serious than any disfunctional aspects of the original LAFTA scheme,
which after all was drafted to be flexible. 19 Indeed, the lack of sensitivity
on the part of the big three to the plight of their less-developed brethren
has been blamed for "all the major conflicts that arose in LAFTA. ' '20
It is easy to trace the advantages which accrued to the heavyweights
under LAFTA. For example, between 1960 and 1969, the intra-LAFTA
exports of the three most developed countries increased $535 million
dollars, or about 233%, while imports from within the association grew
by about $362 million, only 105%. During the same nine-year period
following the instigation of LAFTA, intrazonal exports from the Andean
Group countries had increased by $195 million, or about 78%, while
LAFTA imports to them went up by $292 million, or close to 158%.z1
The heavyweights were not only enjoying more of the quantitative benefits
of integration under LAFTA, they were at the same time monopolizing
the all-important manufacturing industries. As early as 1965, more than
75% of all manufactured goods originating in Latin America were
produced in Argentina, Brazil, or Mexico.22 To use one important example,
during this same period, Argentina and Brazil accounted for 95% of
the intra-LAFTA exports of non-electrical machinery.2 3
3. LAFTA and Conplementation Agreements. In theory, comple-
mentation agreements - originally only sketchily authorized by the LAFTA
Treaty as an adjunct to the liberalization program - might have served
the industrial planning function lacking in the tariff-concession lists and
helped immensely to disperse benefits equitably among all LAFTA
countries. 24 In practice complementation agreements have suffered from
many of the same problems which beset the liberalization programs: an
overly-general recognition of problems in an overly-flexible legal frame-
work. As with other LAFTA mechanisms for integration, the heavyweights
grabbed a lion's share of the benefits available under complementation
agreements. Twenty agreements have been approved to date by the
contracting parties. Few have not included more than one of the three
dominant countries; many have included all; only one has excluded all
three.25
The Treaty of Montevideo describes complementation agreements as
a means of coordinating and harmonizing the industrial policies of the
LAFTA countries through cooperative planning and agreements to rational-
ize production, but it was Resolution 99(IV) in 1964 which established
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Norms and Procedures for Complementation Agreements.2 6 Although
Resolution 99(IV) shows a substantial concern for industrial planning
and equity for less-developed countries,2 7 no concrete guarantees are in-
cluded, nor any specific obligations created. 28 The initiation of comple-
mentation plans is left to private enterprise. Open access to any agreement
for any member guarantees that a heavyweight's industry may enter in
at any time.
Private enterprise has shown a tendency to utilize complementation
agreements, but- logically enough-often for the rationalization of
multinational firms' operations in a few sectors and seldom with any
concern for overall planning and development. Member governments,
who must sponsor the programs in LAFTA, have not imposed such
criteria. Although LAFTA has sponsored annual sectorial meetings which
may have aided industrial planning, its essential approach has never
deviated from an uncritical welcome for complementary (foreign) in-
vestment, apparently on the outmoded theory that it naturally must have
a positive effect. By 1967 sufficient dissatisfaction had surfaced that a
resolution was adopted calling for study of the regime of complementation
agreements and the proposal of solutions to the continuing problems of
the less developed countries and their lack of participation.2 9
B. Central American Common Market
1. CACM and Integration Industries. Although not as closely at-
tached to CACM as to LAFTA, the Andean Pact has built upon CACM's
experienceY° The Central American countries' program has been the most
successful of the Latin American efforts at integration to date, despite
its current state of affliction. The five member states were concerned
that intra-regional free trade and a common external tariff alone would
not bring about industrialization and equitably-distributed development,
so they derived the concept of "integrated industries." 31 Imposing criteria
that LAFTA's complementation agreements had not imposed, integrated
industries were to involve products important to CACM as a unit. Each
such industry would be assigned to a participant, with no country taking
a second integrated industry until all five countries had at least one.32
Integrated industries were an import-substitution scheme on a sub-
regional scale. For a ten-year period, duty-free imports of raw materials
and intermediate goods were permitted while exclusive external tariff
protection and exclusive access to free regional trade were provided to
the designated industry.3 There was to be close regulation by CACM
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officials and agencies, which issued quality-control standards, price con-
trols, and regulations on sources of capital. 34 Any intra-regional competitor
who wishes may set up an industry duplicating that of an already es-
tablished integrated industry, which loses 10% of its intra-regional tariff
protection each year after establishment until all CACM trade in the
item is on a free basis. 5 This possibility apparently was intended as a
means of keeping integrated industries honest and efficient by exposing
them to competition.
2. CACM's Problems. The CACM has had a strong positive effect
on intra-regional trade, but only three integrated industries have been
approved in its thirteen years.36 The latter may be a better indicator of
CACM's real achievement, or lack thereof, than trade statistics. Even
before the Football War in 1969, CACM was troubled by the same issue
that bedeviled LAFTA: the unequal distribution of integration's benefits.
Although intraregional trade rose more than 35% annually through the
first ten years of CACM's operation, from $21 million to $260 million,37
Guatemala and El Salvador accounted for more than 70% of intra-CACM
industrial trade, while Nicaragua and Honduras were experiencing in-
creased regional trade deficits.)8
Like LAFTA, CACM's structure was too flexible and too confident
of the capacity of the member countries to negotiate equitable resolutions
of sticky issues. In the CACM, the burden was placed on private interests
to initiate proposals for integrated industries, but they did not respond.
Integrated-industry status may not have been worth much: a Costa Rican
tire and tube factory opened after the establishment of the same sort of
enterprise as an integrated industry in Guatemala. The entry of the second
plant probably indicates not only a lack of meaningful intra-regional
protection, but also the failure of the scheme to function as an instrument
of coordination for regional industrialization.
C. The Andean Group's Reliance on Integration for Industrial
Development.
Small wonder that Germanico Salgado, current coordinator of the
Andean Group Junta, draws as the "first conclusion of [the LAFTA and
CACM] experience .. .: no integrated society can result when any
country participant in the integration process, after comparing costs and
difficulties required by the process, which are many, with concrete results
obtained and obtainable, does not persistently perceive a clear positive
balance."3 9
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Salgado's reference is to something deeper than simple trade balances;
circumstances became so unbearable for the more disadvantaged countries
because they were relying on successful integration for development. As
various observers have noted, it is one thing when some participants are
gaining greater benefits than others, but all are developing at a high
rate of growth which is satisfactory to each country's expectations.4 0 It
may even be unimportant whether integration is playing much of a role
in an individual country's performance; all countries will still be more
apt to be magnanimous and, in Professor Behrman's phrase, "it is
relatively easy for the negotiating countries to put the problems of inte-
gration on the other side of the table . . . and face them together. '4 1 It
was the marked absence of such a unanimity of satisfaction with the
process that bedeviled LAFTA, for a number of its member states saw
integration as their only means to the ends of industrializing their
economies and modernizing their societies. In early 1965 President
Eduardo Frei of Chile petitioned four of Latin America's most prestigious
economists for an overall review of LAFTA's program.42 The ambitious
program drafted in response to Frei's initiative had virtually no effect
on LAFTA, but the President's Conference held at Punta del Este in
1967 adopted its endorsement of economic integration as essential to
development in Latin Amer Da. 43
Il1. THE BASIC CONCEPT OF SPID
The Andean Group is first and predominately a vehicle for regional
industrialization. Though it may have other concerns, the major commit-
ment and enthusiasm of the Acuerdo de Cartagena, its Junta, and its
Commission is invested in the belief that an effectively industt'alized
society will prove to be a developed society." Effective industrialization
warrants some definition in this context. It must both take care that all
member countries arrive at a common satisfactory stage of development
when its program is complete and strive to create a subregional industrial
power capable of competing in the world market. As Salgado sums it
up, "The stability of the integrated society as well as its efficiency thus
depend on industrial programming. '45 It is in this sense that one may
remark that SPID hold the key to the future economic development of
the Andean subregion and Latin America.
The basic approach is pitched at efficiency through economies of
scale beyond the capacity of any individual Andean country's market.4 6
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By increasing the economic base, and greater expansion and diversification
of production, maximum utilization of available resources may result.
Several studies have recently focused on the feasibility of such gains in
efficiency within the Andean Group.47 The consensus, not surprisingly,
is that reduced production costs and increased return on investments
should result from production on a subregional scale.4
In some ways the relative lack of industrial development and existing
investment in manufacturing in the Andean Group may be to its ad-
vantage, for industrial planners will need to contend with fewer en-
trenched interests. The SPID have tentatively singled out several key
sectors, chosen not only because they constitute the basics for overall
industrial development, but because they will "generate secondary and
tertiary industries. '49 It takes little imagination to conceive of the immense
forces and countervailing interests which must be reconciled to achieve
the goal of equitably planning an internationally competitive industrialized
subregion.50 The task is one of staggering dimensions, and the Junta is
already far behind its timetable, which would have seen SPID approved
by the end of 197551 at least for the chemical and petrochemical sectors,
the pulp and paper industry, food processing, automobiles, electrical
engineering, electronics, metallurgy, nonmetallic minerals, metal-working,
and iron and steel.
Part of the delay may be due to Venezuela's late entry, but in any
case it is probably more because of the magnitude of the problem than
because of any lack of capacity on the part of the Andean bureaucracy.
The continually darkening political situation in several of the Andean
Group countries will of course add another imponderable to the mix.
A. Institutional Supports for SPID
One of the successes of the Andean Group has been the assured
fashion in which it has gone about establishing a foundation of concrete
mechanisms and policies for its program of industrialization. Decision
No. 5Ts sectorial plan for the metalworking industry was not approved
until more than three years after the inception of the Cartagena Agree-
ment. Previous to that time, in 1968, the charter of the Andean Develop-
ment Corporation had been signed. 52 After the Pact itself, such well-
known decisions were passed as No. 24 on Foreign Investment and Tech-
nology Transfers,53 No. 46 on Multinational (read Andean) Corporations, 4
No. 40 on Avoidance of Double Taxation,5 5 No. 56 on International Road
Transport, 56 and a series reserving products for SPID,57 for Bolivian
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and/or Ecuadorian production,58 or for other designations.5 9 Finally, in
March 1972 the Junta presented the Commission with the comprehensive
General Bases for a Subregional Strategy of Development,6" a multi-volume
report crammed with statistics and projections on key industries, among
other things.
Most of the excitement generated by the Andean Group to date is
due to the above programs. Particularly in its vanguard approach to the
old problem of foreign investment and technology in underdeveloped
countries, the Andean program has not only been noted but imitated.
61
This is not altogether surprising for it is probably true that the sub-
regional effort has become the single most effective outlet for much of
the expertise concerning Latin American and Third World economics
emerging in the last decade and a half. Integration expertise built up in
LAFTA, CACM, and even the European Economic Community has
flowed to the Andean Group. Junta headquarters in Lima are staffed by
a formidable group of experts, and their consultants have been picked
from the world's best. Still, the glitter of the early decisions must not be
allowed to hide the fact that they are primarily supportive. Their razon
de ser is to create a complete institutional framework within which the
Andean Group's prime objective of industrial planning and development
may be served effectively and expeditiously.
B. General Characteristics of SPID
The basic concept of SPID may owe something to LAFTA's com-
plementation agreements 62 and CACM's integrated industries, but the more
recent manifestation has several advantages. Because of the institutional
framework noted immediately above, SPID will have a much better
working environment. There is provision within the existing system to
anticipate and handle most contingencies. While complementation agree-
ments or integrated industries ideally might function identically to SPID,
they - like LAFTA and CACM themselves - were cast in such flexible
legal molds that national self-interest easily frustrated their potential.
In some measure SPID may be antithetical to free enterprise. The
programs' most basic objective is to award potential subregional monopolies
to member countries. SPID's planned approach to industrial development
will initiate and dictate rather specific terms of location, size, and product
to investors. In fact, this ought to cause little discomfiture for many
businessmen (e.g., Japanese, European) accustomed to dirigiste govern-
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ments, but even if it should, prior consultations with business and ultimate
increased production and profits ought to more than offset any restrictions
on business discretion.
All SPID must include, as required by the Cartagena Agreement:
1. A list of those products included in the program, indicated in
Andean tariff nomenclature, NABANDINA ;63
2. Designation of plant sites by nation throughout the subregion;64
3. A common outer tariff for the sector covered by a given SPID;6s
4. Periods during which a country must or may maintain its rights
and obligations under a SPID even though it has renounced the
Andean Pact; 66
5. Exclusive advantages and other special treatment for Bolivia and
Ecuador; 67 and
6. A liberalization schedule which opens the subregional market to
SPID products. 69
There is some flexibility in these elements. Although earlier decisions had
reserved a series of products for SPID, any product classified under
NABANDINA may be included in a SPID.69 This may be important after
1975, for the formulation and approval of SPID appear almost certain
to continue after the time period for which the original comprehensive
list is effective. 70 It may also be possible to draft programs in which all
plant sites are not designated, although presumably the free choice of
plant site would not be extensively used.7 1 The special provisions for
Bolivia and Ecuador of course may be more or less extensive depending
on which sector is being planned.
.There are several potential elements whose use and substance will be
dictated by the special considerations of the sector treated by a given
SPID:
1. Joint programming of new subregional investment and measures
to assure financing; 72
2. Harmonization of internal policies and legislation wherever they
might otherwise hamper a given SPID ;73
3. Liberalization schedules which may set up different time periods
for different products and countries, always retaining the ultimate
free-market obligation ;74
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4. Cooperation necessary to assure the infrastructure indispensable
to any given SPID, with special consideration for Bolivia and
Ecuador;71
5. Specific requirements for certification of products' origin for a
given sector.7 6
By their nature, these elements may prove unnecessary for a given SPID,
but it seems unlikely.
C. The Formulation of SPID
1. Packaging the Program. The path to final approval of a SPID
is arduous. The Junta begins with the list of products reserved for SPID
by Decision No. 25. 77 These tend to be products which are not produced
or are "scarcely developed"78 within the Group countries, although no
SPID is limited strictly to the list of products set down by Decision No. 25
in 1970. That preliminary list is composed of heavy industry classification
which falls into the following specific sectors: chemicals, petrochemicals,
electrical engineering, electronics, pulp and paper, nonmetallic minerals,
metallurgy, food processing, metalworking, motor vehicles, and iron and
steel. 79 Here economies of scale and other efficiencies are most feasible,
and the basic importance of the industries to development most obvious.
These sectors tend to be those which the Andean Group countries have
not developed, and those which are most directly related to their depend-
ence on capitalist countries.
The Junta should arrive at a definitive list in consultation with in-
dustrialists from that sector and related sectors, 0 and economists and
planners who can communicate national concerns as well as project sub-
regional needs. An equitable distribution of SPID industries is a touchstone
of the process, but may be impossible to guarantee. It must depend on a
series of virtual imponderables and courageous value judgments. One
participant in the formulation of Decision No. 57 notes that perhaps it
would have been best "to elaborate the sectorial programs in one great
whole creating an overall industrial development plan for the Subregion,"'81
since trying to balance equities in every SPID may be less proper than
balancing them over the industrial sector generally.
It is up to the Junta to manipulate and knead the raw interests into
a smooth, more or less reconciled package. One potential problem, that
of finding a common denominator, has been greatly aided by the institu-
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tional framework and harmonizing influence of earlier decisions. 2 Avail-
able financing, even the availability and location of individual entre-
preneurs, may become keys to shaping a viable plan. In addition, the
Junta is charged with complementing any SPID with further specific
supporting programs and norms wherever necessary to complete the
package.83
2. The Catchpool: Programs for Rationalization of Existing Industry.
The most difficult products to work into SPID will be those already
manufactured within the Andean Group, the difficulty increasing with
each installation. Assigning the right to instigate production is likely
to harm no entrenched interest; modification or cessation of an established
enterprise does. Where it proves wise, SPID may leave existing plants
to Programs for the Rationalization of Existing Industry (PREI), men-
tioned in the same section of the Cartagena Agreement.8 4 Whereas the
pact is specific in the outlines of SPID, the only obligation it imposes on
the Junta with regard to PREI is that it should propose such programs
to the Commission at least annually.8 5
The PREI may serve as a nice agent for the resolution of SPID's
thorniest problems, by playing off another of the Group's problematical
aspects. One of the original adjustments to provide equity was the creation
of reserve lists of varying numbers of products which countries might
hold back from trade liberalization. 86 Since a country will logically
insulate existing industry, the drafters provided that PREI should turn
first to those products on the lists of exceptions for the Junta's annual
proposals.8 7 This exercise should force members to a gradual consideration
and resolution of competition within the subregion rather than the sudden
shock of stripping away protection at the moment common market status
is supposed to have been achieved. No reserve list will be permitted to
Peru, Chile, Colombia, or Venezuela after 1985 save in "very qualified
cases" specifically approved by the Junta for a definite period.88 Bolivia
and Ecuador may carry their lists to 1990, then recur to the Junta.8 9
3. Overall Coordination. There should be a parallel and often
intertwining process, then, of rationalizing existing industry, through
SPID or PREI, as incipient or potential industry is planned through
SPID. The whole effect should be one of evolution, but not drift; of
negotiation, but not stalemate. Ideally, later SPID should be easier as
the most problematical issues are worked out and complementary support
responds to needs revealed by the specifics of each program.
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IV. THE METALWORKING SECTORIAL PROGRAM
A. The Importance of the Metalworking Sector
The Andean Group Commission approved Decision No. 57 in August
1972, establishing the metalworking sector as the first SPID.90 The
planners thus turned first to a sector of fundamental importance to
industrial development, and one in which the Andean Group countries
lagged most badly. Not only is the sector the principal source of capital
goods for industry, but it also involves the technology to design, produce,
install, and maintain industrial equipment. Without the "technological
infrastructure" ' 1 provided by a strong metalworking sector, the industrial
development of the subregion would be permanently dependent upon im-
ported machinery, repair parts, and technology. Among the usual effects
of such a situation are high costs in subregional production and balance
of payments drains, which tend to hamper hopes for the expansion of
industry. 92
In 1970, more than half of the subregion's manufactured imports were
products from this sector. Import-substitution programs had created
national policies of high tariffs and/or prohibition of entry for consumer
items but virtually unencumbered imports of capital goods. This may have
stifled local development of a sector whose demand should increase from
$2.2 million in 1970 to $11.5 million in 1985, with attendant economies
of scale, if the Andean Group's projections are correct. 93
B. Elements of the Metalworking SPID
1. Product Determination and Plant Location Through the Assign-
ment Unit. In formulating its precedent-setting program the Junta soon
decided to link products and their allocation to individual countries
together in assignment units. Two special problems led to the adoption
of the assignment-unit approach for metalworking: (1) how to classify
products included in the SPID, and (2) what empirical data to use for
the equitable distribution of production among the participants.94 Product
specification was difficult because of the complex nature of the metal-
working sector, whose diversity made it hard to designate generic groups,
at the same time - perversely - physical plant requirements tended to
be sufficiently homogeneous that there was little division possible on that
basis.
Another problem for the Junta was the lack of detailed statistics
on which to base assignment of industries to the various countries.95 It
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was essential that assignments be parceled out with utmost regard for
equity, although there was some doubt as to what equity meant in practical
terms.96 Apparently the Junta opted for a straightforward approach,
dividing the product universe into general categories called assignment
units and projecting gross production values for each category to 1980.
Equitable allocation was then based on a rough division of the projected
gross production values, 97 with the onus on each state to object to those
aspects of the original proposal it felt were inconsistent with its national
concerns. 9' This method probably explains why out of the 128
NABANDINA positions originally reserved to the metal working SPID,
only 72 assignment units were ultimately created.99 Those products which
could not be negotiated were either left for inclusion in another SPID or
allowed to fall back into the basic liberalization program.
Assignment units correspond roughly to NABANDINA positions.
They encompass many products in almost every case, with a very broad
technology spectrum for any given assignment unit. Working from such
general assignments, a country is expected to select which of the several
potential products within each of its designated units it wishes to manu-
facture. The Junta, unable to carry out feasibility studies for each of the
thousands of products which might have been included in the SPID's
original 128 nomenclature classifications, has put this onus on the member
countries, which should come forward within two years100 (three in the
case of Bolivia and Ecuador) 101 with feasibility studies and detailed data
on those products it wishes to produce. Production is to begin within three
years after the delivery of the feasibility studies. 10 2
2. Country Packages. The method of assignment units means that
each country has a broad range of potential subregional monopolies in
those assignment units allocated exclusively. Only 45 of the assignments
are exclusive, however, with many divided between two countries and
two units assigned among Chile, Peru, and Colombia equally. 0 3 In case
of multiple assignment, there is apparently some premium on priority in
time of submission or existing installations. The basic hope is to create
blocs of specialization and technology development for each country, and
overall the subregion, through effective response to the assignments. There-
fore, the planners paid some attention to special interests and capabilities
of each country, although they appeared to believe that "technological
superiority derives more from economies of scale than from advantages
of location."' °4 Applying this principle, it becomes important to allocate
assignment units equitably so that each country starts with "a germ of
development which will grow to comparative advantage over time. °10 5
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a. Bolivia, with an extensive mining sector, was assigned units in-
cluding mining machinery: crushers, drill bits, air compressors,
for example. Bolivia should also participate in electrical equip-
ment and basic machinery, with specialization hoped for in
smelting, forging, and production of molds and dies. Bolivia has
nine exclusive units and shares one.
b. Chile, which probably has the best balanced metalworking sector
of the Group, is the only country to receive assignment units
in each of the seven major headings for the sector.10 6 Greatest
emphasis should fall on electrical machinery and consumer
durables and capital goods for their mass production. Chile
has the fewest exclusive assignments, six of a total of twenty-
two units.
c. Colombia, another relatively more developed country in this
sector, also enjoys assignments diversified throughout various
product groupings. Colombia should be able to establish all of
the basic technologies within the metalworking sector, with its
diversification also fostering service industries. Specialization
should occur in agricultural machinery, aeronautical and food
processing equipment, and toys. Colombia shares fourteen of its
twenty-three assignment units.
d. Ecuador, like Bolivia, has almost no extant metalworking sector.
The Junta allocated Ecuador a package of assignment units which
should permit development of light metalworking products,
measuring tools, electronic controls, clocks and hydraulic machin-
ery. Again like Bolivia, Ecuador shares only one of its assign-
ment units, ten being exclusive.
e. Peru has concentrated in mining, fishing, agriculture and the
processing of raw materials from those areas. With fair develop-
ment and broad diversification, Peru received the most assign-
ment units, twenty-five, of which it shares fourteen. Specialization
should occur in electro-mechanical products like transformers and
generators, mining tools and equipment, hoists, thermostats, and
tooling machinery.
It is of course virtually impossible to evaluate the Junta's handling of
assignment packages. Figure I demonstrates that they give Bolivia and
Ecuador a smaller share in absolute terms, both in number of units
assigned and their projected value, and in terms of projected value break
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Chile and Colombia out slightly ahead of Peru. In rough calculation
Bolivia and Ecaudor each get one-eighth of the projected-value pie, and
Chile, Peru, and Colombia one-quarter each. However, there is such a
chaos of considerations and imponderables beyond the simple product
values that no such superficial judgment is permissible. 10 7 Much, if not
all, will depend on the evolution and development of SPID through
individual countries' responses, encouraged and paced by the Junta and
the rest of the institutional framework.
FIGURE I
Bolivia Chile Colombia Ecuador Peru Total
Total Units
Assigned 10 22 23 11 25 72*
Units Assigned





of dollars) 34.2 71.6 73.5 37.2 67.9 284.3
*Shared assignments account for this figure. But see note 99 supra.
Source: Avila, Programacidn. de la Industria Metalnmecdnaica en el Acuerdo
de Cartagena, Revista de la Integraci6n No. 13 at 193, 210
Fig. 4 (1973).
3. Trade Liberalization. Although the heart of any SPID is the
assignment of industries to participant countries and the division of
potential benefits thus accomplished, it is the accompanying adjustments
in tariff schedules that effectively guarantee access to an extended sub-
regional market protected from external competition. We have referred
to the effective subregional monopoly created by SPID assignments, but
there is no prohibition against production of assigned items outside the
favored country. The monopoly is not on production but on the tariff
advantages within the subregional structure.
Since 20 September 1972, thirty days after Decision No. 57 entered
into force, no Andean country may charge any tariff on metalworking
SPID products manufactured under the aegis of an assignment unit.108
THE ANDEAN SECTORAL PROGRAM
Lest the measure be evaded by non-tariff restrictions or exotic calculation
schemes, the SPID commands that all restrictions of "whatever type" be
eliminated along with tariffs'019 and that all tariffs be expressed in ad
valorem terms.110 In order to create a preferential margin for the country
favored with an assignment, all Andean Group countries maintain existing
tariffs on the same product manufactured by any other member, with
the limitation that such tariffs may not exceed the level of those established
by Decision No. 57 as common outer tariffs for metalworking products.1"
Subregional tariff advantages are not permanent. When Bolivia or
Ecuador is the country favored with an assignment unit under the metal-
working SPID, it may maintain its existing intra-zonal tariff structures
(up to the level of the common outer tariff) until 31 December 1985 to
handicap the same items produced in other member countries.112 All
other metal working products should move duty-free within the Andean
Group after 31 December 1980.113 Thus, by 1981 on most Decision-57
items and by 1986 for all under the SPID, a subregional common market
should have opened to an expanding and progressive sector. This ultimate
prospect should generate healthy pressures on any inefficient operation
relying for its viability on the margin of preference created by the tariff
advantage.114
Essentially, the program permits continued discrepancies between
national tariff schedules, subject to the harmonizing effect of the common
outer tariff only as an upper limit, until all tariffs are finally removed.
For products falling within units assigned to two or three countries, the
management of preferences requires a bit more harmony. All countries
with the right to produce within the unit must first drop their tariffs to
that of the lowest duty imposed by any of them for the product in
question.115 Then, after production of the assigned items begins, tariffs
will be eliminated among the favored countries in three years, in steps
of 40%, 30%, and 30%.116 Throughout the process, of course, assignment-
unit products from any of the countries enjoy free entry into non-favored
Andean Group member counfries and all six countries maintain existing
tariffs against the same items produced within the subregion without
benefit of assignment.
The countries participating in an assignment unit may agree among
themselves upon a more rapid elimination of tariffs than that specified
in Decision No. 57. When each wishes to specialize in a different product
line within the single assignment unit- not an unlikely possibility-
they may jointly petition the Junta to propose a special program of
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liberalization.' 1 7 Presumably such petition would ask for distinction of
each product so that it would enjoy unique margins of preference in sub-
regional trade until 1981 or 1986.
4. Common External Tariff. Consistent with the tailored approach
to development in each sector which is the hallmark of the SPID, Decision
No. 57 establishes specific common outer tariff levels for each product
covered by the assignment units. The special tariffs are detailed in Annex
V to the Decision.111 s Since circumstances vary from one product to
another, 1 9 the Metalworking SPID's special outer tariffs vary between
40% and 80%, with an average of 56.5% for all products included. In
the phrase of Dr. Javier Silva Ruete, the common outer tariff "serves as
a reference point from which to measure the efficiency of new produc-
tion," 120 and Decision No. 57 contemplates the steady reduction of its
levels in a manner which will "reconcile the necessity of stimulating
maximum subregional efficiency with adequate protection."' 121 If the
ultimate goal is competition in the world market, the final level of the
common outer tariff for metalworking items should be quite low, at
least in a significant number of cases.
The common outer tariff applies to all products either originating
outside of or not proceeding from member countries.122 Rates are set not
only for products actually produced within the Andean Group, but also
for their assembly parts as well as for substitute or competitive items.
123
The Annex V tariffs are not immediately applicable, entering into effect
once the Junta has verified the existing production of assigned items under
the SPID, or on the 31st of December preceding the start-up date projected
by feasibility studies approved in the Junta.24 Since its initial purpose is
protective, all countries with lower rates must raise their tariffs up to
the common level. However, countries with higher rates may maintain
them through 1976, after which they must reduce them to coincide with
the common external tariff by the end of 1980,125 as the common tariff
level begins its trend downward, to force increasing efficiency by exposing
subregional SPID items to extra-Andean competition. 126
Mauricio Guerrero, of the Junta's legal staff, points out that the
scheme established by the Metalworking SPID is more restrictive than
the general program for a common outer tariff instituted by the Cartagena
Agreement. 127 The latter would permit variation in tariffs by any country
so long as actual production had not begun within the subregion under
its integration program. 12' Even after the initiation of production, the
Junta would normally be empowered to propose relaxation of the common
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outer tariff along with any other measures it might feel were "necessary
to reconcile the necessity of protecting subregional production with that
of assuring normal supplies." 129
The decision to drop individual countries' freedom to deviate from
the common outer tariff for the Metalworking SPID apparently was
made out of fear that such liberties might be abused to "permit stock-
piling in other member countries which could prejudice the subregional
producer in its most critical period, that of the initiation of activities."
' 130
Individual countries may still petition the Junta to propose to the Com-
mission that the common barrier be lowered to ease "transitory insuffi-
ciencies of supply" in the petitioning country,"' but that is a far cry
and several procedural steps from unilateral freedom to vary protective
margins until the moment production starts.
The Junta is charged, under the Metalworking program as in general,
with overall vigilance of the effects of any common outer tariff. Under
the terms of the Acuerdo de Cartagena, unaffected by any provision in
Decision No. 57, the Junta may propose to the Commission at any time
those adjustments it feels are necessary to respond: a) to the "exigencies
of the subregion, b) to the special situation of Bolivia and Ecuador, and
c) to the common outer tariff eventually fixed by LAFTA." 13 2 Presumably
none of those possible concerns should affect the first SPID in the near
future.
5. Complementary Measures. In virtually every SPID, as con-
templated in the Cartagena Agreement, it will be necessary to include
so-called complementary measures to assure that the basic program
objectives will not be thwarted by indirect actions of any participant
country. 3 The complementary measures created under Decision No. 57
are not extensive. Primary among them is a strict proscription against
the official encouragement of either the installation or expansion of
metalworking enterprises save in those countries to which the particular
item involved is assigned under the SPID. The prohibition is not cate-
gorical, for states are not bound to prevent such investments; instead
they must refrain from applying any of the standard means of fomenting
industrial development - state aid or participation, credit preferences,
and tax, exchange or tariff benefits- in their favor. Existing programs or
official obligations are not affected by the provision, which operates only
prospectively. 13 4
Wary of potential state action by individual member countries which
might subvert the evolution of a successful subregional metalworking
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sector, Decision No. 57 is downright xenophobic regarding direct foreign
investment which might try to gain entry into any single country. Of
course any investment under such an arrangement could not participate in
the benefits or programs of subregional integration, but it might seriously
hamper the subregional industry's access to a given national market, as
has apparently occurred in the Central American Common Market. 13 5 The
Metalworking SPID includes a categorical duty not to authorize direct
foreign investment in any of the respective national territories which
would entail any production of items assigned to other countries.'
3
'
The complementary measures do not provide a permanent buffer
against the creation of national competition for subregional metalworking
enterprises, in either the case of the prohibition against official encourage.
ment of national investment or in that against the authorization of direct
foreign investment for a specific nation. For those products falling into
an assignment unit designated to Chile, Colombia, or Peru, the advantage
obtains through the end of 1982.137 For those designated to either Bolivia
or Ecuador, this particular complementary measure is valid through 31
December 1987.138 The philosophy of the drafters here, as in other pro-
visions throughout Decision No. 57, is to assure a salutary head start
to the incipient subregional industry, but not a permanent prop on which
a flabby, inefficient sector might ultimately lean.13 9
Since it is a shibboleth of the Andean Group's program that it wishes
to develop export capability in its industrial sector, it is not surprising that
the complementary measures of the SPID under discussion here should
devote attention to that subject. Any country favored with an exclusive
assignment may continue to use any and all direct methods for encourag-
ing exports of the product in question, be it to Andean Group or third
countries.1 40 Presumably, the result of national export incentives within
the Andean Group should be decreased costs to the importing member,
with short run benefits to immediate consumers and the country's balance
of payments. In the long run, as the market power of the subregion grows
with increased sales, there is a collective benefit.
If the case of exclusive assignments appears easy, however, that of
shared assignment units is more difficult, since untrammeled use of
export incentives could skew natural competition factors and have a
negative effect on the ultimate efficiency and resource allocation of the
subregion. In case of multiple assignment, the SPID provides that direct
incentives for exports may be utilized only for extra-zonal transactions,
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unless the several participants within the assignment unit are able to
agree upon their use within the subregion as well.14 1
There are several other complementary measures, but none are of
great importance. One reiterates what the Cartagena Agreement already
makes explicit: no safeguard clauses may be applied against products manu-
factured under the auspices of the SPID.142 There are references to co-
ordination between Decision No. 57 and Decisions No. 46 on Andean
Corporations and No. 49 on Harmonization of Industrial Incentives. 143 A
Metalworking Committee is created, composed of technical representatives
to be named from each member country, which will advise the Junta
on its administration of the evolving pioneer program. 44
Any products assigned by the Metalworking SPID which may have
been included on the lists of exceptions to trade liberalization submitted
by the member countries must be taken off such lists. 14 And there is a
reference to technical norms, ceding control to the "competent organism"
of each country, which has been superseded by the recent promulgation
of Decision No. 84 establishing technical norms for the subregion. 146 None
of these measures introduces a jarring note. All are predictable and
consistent with the main objectives and means which course throughout
Decision No. 57.
6. Venezuela's Participation. Venezuela joined the Andean Group
after the approval of Decision No. 57 and its late entry has created some
problems for the Metalworking SPID. Under Decision No. 70, which
confirmed Venezuela's inclusion in the Andean Group, the Junta is
charged with preparing a plan for the new member's participation in
the SPID within six months after Venezuela deposits its adherence with
the Commission. 147 Such a plan may have to increase the number of
assigned products by finding some that are uniquely suited to production
in Venezuela, for Decision No. 70 was rather protective of acquired
rights in the Metalworking SPID. Unless one of the original five agrees
to cede some of its rights, the "efficacy" of the initial assignment units
may not be affected 148 In addition, Venezuela is to "endeavor not to
encourage" the production within its territory of any items already assigned
under Decision No. 57.149 One way of resolving the problem is suggested
by another article, which provides that so long as no plan is approved
for Venezuela's participation in the Metalworking SPID, the Venezuelan
market will not be opened under its auspices to metalworking products
from the rest of the subregion, nor will the subregion be opened to such
items originating in Venezuela1S0
LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
Venezuela does represent a special economic case within the Andean
Group. The wealth derived from its natural resources has given it a
stable currency and a higher per capita income. Among other things,
these circumstances indicate a significantly higher cost structure than
exists in other member countries, which tend to be fairly homogeneous.
This unfavorable disparity has led to expressions of pessimism by those
who fear that entry into the Andean Group will permit a flood of cheap,
poor-quality goods into the Venezuelan national market from sources
protected 'by the common outer tariff and benefitted by increasingly
liberalized subregional trade. Venezuela, in this view, derives almost
nothing from adherence to the Andean Pact, since it does not need and
will not derive much advantage from the subregional market.
This negative view of Venezuela's participation in the Andean Group
is unreasonably short-sighted. If the Metalworking SPID - with or without
Venezuela's participation - and the other SPID which follow it result
in efficient industries which can compete worldwide, then Venezuela will
not be harmed by diverting its trade to the subregion. Quality and price
of Andean products should ultimately prove at least acceptable by com-
parison with current sources, and Venezuela's overall development and
economic strength should be appreciably advanced by its stake in the
increasingly powerful subregional industrial sector. Again, of course, the
country must pin its development hopes on integration. Perhaps Venezuela
has more to lose from an unsuccessful integration effort in the short run
than other member countries. Venezuela may also have more to gain from
successful integration, since the current bases for its economic strength
might stand it in good stead in any final conformation of the subregion.
V. CONCLUSION
We stress that Decision No. 57 and the other SPID which will follow
it represent the culmination of the Andean Group as an integration effort.
Each distinct sector presents a different and difficult traverse for the
Junta insofar as the all-important equitable assignment of industries is
concerned,"" but the Metalworking decision has clarified many basic
issues and techniques and will serve as an excellent model as other SPID
are drafted. It is disquieting that no further SPID have been promulgated
to date, but this does not indicate that no work is being done or that
prospects are entirely dim. It does indicate that integration timetables-
despite the fact that the Andean Group in its first few years has had an
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exceptional record of hitting deadlines - are normally at the mercy of
such a plethora of factors that both successful and timely resolution of
the competing forces is almost impossible. The Andean Group has ap-
parently opted for success rather than timeliness.
Until the moment that the other SPID take definite substance
almost everything in the Andean Group is mystique and conjecture.152
All that has gone before, save the Metalworking SPID, is simply definitive
of the limits and potentialities of the subregional effort, a negotiating
framework in which to cast its real task: planned subregional industrial
development. The Andean Group can be quite sanguine about deviation
from earlier, form-establishing decisions. Dr. Felipe Salazar Santos, then
Coordinator of the Junta, was asked in 1973 if he were not concerned
about apparent deviations within member countries from Decision No. 24
on Foreign Investment and Transfer of Technology. His reply was that
evasions and unilateral modifications were almost inevitable, but that
the Decision's major importance was to place industry on a solid sub-
regional plane, a purpose achieved within the context of Decision No. 57153
Neither Dr. Salazar nor any of the other executives of the Andean
Group could be so philosophical about evasions of commitments under
the Metalworking SPID, but apparently they have no cause for concern
as yet. In August 1974, consistent with the deadline, the three larger
member countries submitted their feasibility reports on their projected
production under Decision No. 57s assignment units.154 Many projects are
already far beyond the feasibility stage and subregional trade in metal-
working products has begun. An example of the positive impact of planned
Andean industrial development is the agreement between the Swedish firm
of Atlas Copco A.B. and Bolivia, for the installation of an enterprise to
produce air compressors and pneumatic drills' 155 Atlas Copco Andina
S.A. projects production of $33 million within ten years, building on a
total investment of over $10 million in the form of a loan from the foreign
investor. Rather than equity, Atlas Copco A.B. apparently wants control
over the destination of a percentage of the Bolivian-Andean firm's produc-
tion, which Bolivia was willing to give. The nice interplay between the
rules of the game set down by Decision No. 24 and other framework
measures and the guarantees of an effective subregional monopoly under
Decision No. 57 seems clear. This interplay is probably the sole reason
for the investment in Bolivia, and a satisfying vindication of the Andean
Group's goals. Hopefully it will be repeated many times over in the next
decade.
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When he received the first metalworking feasibility studies from
member countries' representatives in Lima last August, the present Co-
ordinator of the Junta, Dr. Germ~nico Salgado, said, "This is an unfor-
gettable moment in the world history of economic integration. I do not
think that such a transcendent step has ever been taken before, with pro-
found significance for the solidarity [of member states] and their decision
to march together in the construction of the future.' 156 History will have
a final verdict on the Andean Group's bold new thrust at development.
The verdict should come in relatively quickly, in a decade or so, but
hopes are high.
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tion No. 68, Executive Council, Central American Common Market.
3 7Cable, The "Football War" and the Central American Common Market, 45
INT'L AFFAIRS 658, 664 (1969).
38BusINESS INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH REPORT, THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COM-
MON MARKET 18 (1969).
39El Grupo Andino: Un Concepto Nuevo en la Jntegraci6n Econ6mica, Hackett
Memorial Lecture, University of Texas, 5 April 1972, at 11.
4 OSee, e.g., MILENKY, supra note 19, at 101-04; ORTUNO, BOLIVIA Y LA INTEGRA-
CION ECONOMICA DE AMERICA LATINA 134-35 (1969); SALGADO, supra note 23, at
11-16.
4 1
BEHRMAN, supra note 24, at 27.
42The creation of the Andean Group is generally traced from 6 January 1965,
when President Frei sent a letter to "The Four" (Prebisch, Mayobre, Herrera, Sanz
de Santamaria) asking for concrete suggestions for accelerating the integration
process in Latin America. Their reply was published by the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank and formed the basis for the 1966 Declaration of Bogotei, in which all
present Andean Group countries save Bolivia took part, specifically proposing a
subregional pact. The proposition was then considered by LAFTA and at other
inter-American conferences and meetings until 1969, when the Acuerdo de Carta-
gena was signed. See MAYOBRE, et al., HACIA LA INTEGRACION ACELERADA DE AMERICA
LATINA (1965). This publication includes Frei's letter and the report prepared in
response to it. The same events are recounted several places, probably most defi-
nitely in DERECHO, supra note 13, at 468-530.
43The Declaration of 1967 includes integration as its first objective and virtually
all of its main action program is aimed at that objective. See 55 DEP'T STATE BULL.
712-17 (1967). Six years before, at the time the Alliance for Progress was initiated,
economic integration had been only one of many objectives and most of the imple-
mentation had been cast in terms of internal reforms. See 41 DEP'T STATE BULL. 463
(1961). Of course, the meeting of 1967 probably would not have been held but for
the concern over LAFTA's course.
44This is properly a question of profound philosophical inquiry. See Kozolchyk,
Toward a Theory on Law in Economics, 1971 LAW & Soc. 0. 681; Trubek, Toward
a Social Theory of Law, 82 YALE L.J. 1 (1972).
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We are here not pursuing that inquiry, for it seems quite clear that the
Andean Group is committed to the position stated here. See, e.g., Supplement to
COMERCIo EXTERIOR, BASES GENERALES PARA UNA ESTRATEGIA SUBREGIONAL DE
DESARROLLO 19-20 (Nov., 1972) [hereinafter cited as BASES GENERALES]; Salazar,
Una Visidn, General del Grupo Andino. (Lecture presented at the Jornadas Hispano-
Andinas, Madrid, 23 May 1973.)
45Salgado, El Grupo Andino y el Poder de la Acci6n Solidaria 19, published
by Andean Group's Junta (Sept., 1972). See BASES GENERALES, supra note 44, at 30;
Silva Ruete, La Programaci6n en el Grupo Andino 2-8 (Lecture presented at the
Jornadas Hispano-Andnas, Madrid, June, 1973).
46See, e.g., BEHRMAN, supra note 24, at 5, 12, 31; CARNOY, supra note 22,
at 68-69.
Colombia is the most populous country, with 22 million inhabitants, but Bolivia
has only about 4 million. The region as a whole includes 67 million people, with
a per capita annual income of $461, ranging from $195 per year in Bolivia to $847
in Venezuela. Gross national product totals $31 billion for the subregion, ranging
from Venezuela's $9 billion to Bolivia's $900 million. GRUPo ANDINO: ORIGEN,
OBJETIVOS, MEcANISMOS Y LocRos (1973).
47 Most notably CARNOY supra note 22; BEHRMAN, supra note 24; BASES GEN-
ERALES, supra note 44; Schydlowsky, Allocating Integration Industries in the
Andean Group, 9 J. COMM. MKT. STUDIES 299 (1971).
4 8One economist, who worked with the studies, notes that their conclusions
"were not much different from those which could have been predicted by a less
rigorous and elaborate analysis." Avila, supra note 11, at 193, 205.
49 BusINESS INT'L CORP., THE ANDEAN COMMON MARKET 36 (1970).
50KucYZNSKI & HUELIN, supra note 11, at 11-12; Avila, supra note 11, at 203-10.
The latter cite is to an article by an Andean Junta economist who participated
directly in drafting of Decision No. 57.
5 1Acuerdo, supra note 2, art. 47. In 1970, the Commission approved a long list
of products reserved to sectorial programs. These were conceived to break down
into the following programs: automotive, glass, paper and pulp, pesticides, fertilizers,
pharmaceutical, steel, petrochemicals, dyes and fine chemicals. See Decision No. 25
of December 1970, changed to NABANDINA by Decision No. 59 of September 1972.
A more specific breakdown of the product classifications covered is set out in
Silva Ruete, supra note 45, at 11-12.
52 Approved in Bogoti, 7 February 1968. HISTORIA DOCUMENTAL, supra note 2,
at 375; 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 940 (1969).
5 3December 1970; in English, 11 INT'L L. MATERIALS 126 (1972).
"See Furnish, 'El Rigimen Comin del Grupo Andino para las Inversiones
Extranjeras,' DERECHO DE LA INTEGRACION No. 14 at 85 (1973); Furnish, 'The
Andean Common Market's Common Regime for Foreign Investment,' 5 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L LAW 313 (1972)."
5 4December 1971; in English, 11 INT'L L. MATERIALS 357 (1972).
55November 1971.
5 6August 1972.
57Decision No. 57 of December 1970.
58Decisions Nos. 28 and 29 of December 1970, No. 34 of March 1971.
59 See Decisions No. 26 and 27 of December 1970, dealing with products to
receive special customs treatment.
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6 0 See ANDEAN GROUP JUNTA BASES GENERALES PARA UNA ESTRATEGIA SUB-
REGIONAL DE DESARROLLO (1972). This is a multi-volume report with extensive data.
A synthesis of its policy statement was included as a supplement in both Comercio
Exterior (Nov. 1972) and GRuPo ANDINO No. 12 (April, 1972)
6 1The recently-enacted foreign technology laws of Argentina and Mexico were
patterned after the Andean Group's program. KuCYZNSKI & HUELIN, supra note 11,
at 32; Tancer & Zanotti, The Mexican Law of Foreign Real Estate Investment in
the Prohibited Zones: An Overview, 1971-73, Appendix B (Arizona State University
Center for Latin American Studies, 1974).
62 The Andean Group did not include complementation agreements in its pro-
gram, even though originally they were going to participate in LAFTA's complemen-
tation agreements. In Decision No. 8 of March 1970 the Andean Group members
decided to stay out of all complementation agreements under the Treaty of
Montevideo.
6 3Acuerdo, supra note 2, art. 34(a). For a more comprehensive treatment of
SPID characteristics, see Guerrero, La Programacidn del Desarrollo Industrial Sub-
regional y El Primer Programa Sectorial de la Industria Metalmecdnica, 12 DERECHO
DE LA INTECRACION 35 (1973). We disagree with Guerrero's analysis in several places,
despite his official position in the Junta's legal section and his undeniable expertise
in matters regarding the Andean Group. Most immediately, Guerrero breaks those
characteristics necessary to every SPID apart from those which may be desirable
in some SPID, but are not vital. We have followed his classification, but include as
vital elements two items he would relegate to potential status: special treatment
for Bolivia and Ecuador, and a liberalization schedule for the subregion. We cannot
think of any SPID which could not include those elements. Dr. Javier Silva Ruete,
Executive Secretary to the Junta, in his list of elements to be included in SPID,
is more in agreement with the authors. See Silva Ruete, supra note 45, at 14.





69Guerrero, supra note 63, at 36. We here rely on Guerrero for interpretation of
a matter not clear in the Acuerdo.
7 OAcuerdo, supra note 2, art. 47. All the products originally reserved by Decision
No. 25 were to have been included in the SPID completed before 31 December
1973, extendible to 31 December 1975.
71Guerrero, supra note 63, at 36, 42.43. Again, Guerrero clarifies a matter left
vague in the Acuerdo.
72 Acuerdo, supra note 2, art. 34(b).




77 Decision No. 25, supra note 51.
78Andean Group Junta Program for the Metalworking Industry of the Andean
Group's Sectoral Development (brochure),
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KUCYZNSKI & HUELIN, supra note 11, at 12.
80Avila, supra note 11, at 212-13.
8Id. at 208.
82See text accompanying notes 52-61.
83A4cuerdo, supra note 2, arts. 34, 35.
841d. art. 35.
85Id. art. 36. Although PREI had not been initiated before, in 1974 the Junta
hoped to begin their elaboration "in sectors like the textile industry and the so-called
white-line [of durable appliances]." Silva Ruete, supra note 45, at 14.




9 0Decision No. 57, supra note 12. The Andean Group has taken pains to
publicize the first SPID, ranging from small brochures to rather extensive mono-
graphs, with appendices, in Spanish and English. See Andean Group Junta, SECTORAL
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM FOR THE METALWORKING INDUSTRIES [hereafter cited as
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM].
91The phrase is from Decision No. 57, art. 1, repeated by Galo Montafia, El
Programa Metalmecdnico del Grupo Andino 11 (Lecture presented at the Jornadas
Hispano-Andinas, June 1973).
9 2See discussions of the importance of the metalworking sector in Avila, supra
note 11, at 199-201; Galo Montafia, supra note 91, at 7-11; DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM,
supra note 90, at 5-9, 11-13.
9 3 DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, supra note 90, at 8-9.
94 Avila, supra note 11, at 204; Galo Montafia, supra note 91, at 12-14.
9 5 But see notes 47 and 48 supra. For example, Schydlowsky's article, cited supra
note 47, might have been an excellent model for equitable distribution, but suggests
a system that depends on reliable determination of foreign exchange saved or
generated by a particular assignment, the marginal social cost of internal resources
to be used, and the marginal utility of foreign exchange. Schydlowsky himself
notes the lack of data sufficient to carry out the sort of analysis he posits. His
alternative method, the assignment of a few projects at a time instead of the whole
sector, is rejected by Avila-and apparently the Junta-as politically unacceptable.
Avila, supra note 11, at 206 n.9.
961d. at 209.
9 7Galo Montafia, supra note 91, at 13-16; DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, supra note
90, at 30.
9'8This was accomplished by a series of bilateral conferences between the Junta
and each participant. See Avila, supra note 11, at 209-10.
9 9Although a mathematical approach would break down 45 unique assignments,
20 double assignments, and two triple assignments to a simple total of 67 assign-
ment units, a count of the units set out in an Appendix of DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
reveals 72 in all. The authors are at a loss to explain the apparent discrepancy.
Galo Montafio twice mentions that there are 91 assignment units in the first
SPID. Supra note 91, at 14, 19. Despite the authority of the source, he appears
mistaken.
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1t0Decision No. 57, art. 5.
10lid. art. 6.
102Id. arts. 5-6. If proper studies are not carried out and/or production is not
begun within the proper time limits, the products thus ignored fall back into the
Andean Pact's automatic liberalization program. Id. art. 8.
103 See DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, supra note 90, Appendix II, 29-50, for a specific
breakdown of each country, its assigned units, and those it shares.
104Avila, supra note 11, at 207, citing Kitamura, La Teoria Econ6mica y la
Integracidn Econ6mica de las Regiones Subdesarroladas, in Wionczek (ed.), INTE-
GEACION DE AMERICA LATINA, EXPERIENCIAS Y PERSPECTIVAS (1964).
1 051d. at 206. Article 1 of Decision No. 57 is also rather illustrative:
The Member Countries commit themselves to carry out this program in the
spirit of Article 32 of the Cartagena Agreement, with the principal ob-
jective of promoting the development of an efficient metal working industry
in their territories, by means of instigation and consolidation of the basic
technological infrastructure necessary for such an effect. This development
should create bases so that all countries may strengthen the structure of
their industrial sectors, improve their capacity to adapt and generate tech-
nology, and create possibilities for specialization by planning subregional
and world commerce.
10 6The major divisions of the metalworking sector are: specific machinery, basic
machinery, machine tools, electrical equipment, transportation equipment, tools and
other instruments, and consumer goods and appliances.
t071t is difficult to determine exactly how the drafters of Decision No. 57
measured the "gross production value" among the participant countries. Per capita
income, GNP, or projected population seem to be the basis for the projection and
its division.
108Decision No. 57, art. 10.
1091d. art. 14.
11d. art. 15.
t1Id. arts. 10, 13.
1121d. art. 11.
tld. art. 10.
1 14This may have been patterned after the CACM's approach. See notes 33 and
35 supra and accompanying text.
11 5Decision No. 57, art. 12, a).
2161d. art. 12, b).
1171d. art. 12, c).
1181d. art. 16.
119Avila and Silva Ruete list the circumstances to be taken into account as
follows:
1. degree of product elaboration
2. technological complexity of the process
3. employment provided to the working force
4. economics of scale
5. existence of subregional production
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6. degree of integration
7. preferential treatment for Bolivia and Ecuador
Avila, supra note 11, at 221-22; Silva Ruete, supra note 45, at 18.
As Avila points out in his Table 10, the common outer tariff will represent
an increase on most products for the member countries, save in Chile where the
average pre-SPID tariff on assigned products was 82.6%. All other countries had
an average tariff under 50%, with Bolivia's being only 30.7%.
t 2 0Silva Ruete, supra note 45, at 18. The Andean Times called it "the allowable
level of inefficiency." See issue of 22 March 1974 at 4-5.
12tDecision No. 57, art. 23.
1221d. art. 16.
123Id. arts. 17, 19.
124Id. arts. 17, 18.
1251d. art. 21.
1261d. art. 20.
12 7Guerrero, supra note 63, at 45.
12t Acuerdo, supra note 2, art. 65.
1291d.
130Guerrero, supra note 63, at 45. Decision No. 57, art. 22, is categorical in its
prohibition against not only unilateral deviation from the common outer tariff itself,
but also against "any special treatment which might modify" its impact.
131Acuerdo, supra note 2, art. 67. This is of course the same basic measure as
that provided in Acuerdo, art. 65, supra note 128 and accompanying text, but shifts
the burden of initiative onto the individual state.
13 2Acuerdo, supra note 2, art. 66.
13 3See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
'
3 4-Decision No. 57, art. 24. The provision includes, in addition to the enumerated
incentives to industrial investment, a dragnet clause against "measures of any nature
which might divert the objectives pursued."
135See text following note 38 supra.
136Decision No. 57, art. 25. Presumably the term "direct foreign investment" as
used here is that defined in Decision No. 24, art. 1, as:
Contributions, coming from abroad and belonging to foreign individuals
or enterprises, made to the capital of an enterprise, in freely convertible
currency, industrial plants, machinery, or equipment, and having the right
to re-exportation of their value and the transfer of profits abroad.
Likewise, investments in local currency from funds which are entitled
to be transferred abroad shall be considered to be foreign investments.
Decision No. 24, art. 1, found in 11 INT'L L. MATERIALS 128 (1972).
13 7Decision No. 57, art. 26.
13 8ld.
139We make this point despite the fact that Maurice Guerrero and the Cartagena
Agreement may stand against us. Perhaps a strictly legal construction should have
commanded permanent effect for article 24 and 25. See Guerrero, supra note 63, at
46-47. Regardless, the economic criteria of the drafters in placing a time limit on
the prohibitions of art. 24 and 25 seem to us quite correct.
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140Decision No. 57, art. 27, a). See Acuerdo, supra note 2, art. 30; Decision
No. 29 of Dec. 1971, arts. 28-30.
1411d. art. 27, b).
1421d. art. 29; Acuerdo, supra note 2, art. 81.
14 3Decision No. 57, arts. 34, 33. See Guerrero, supra note 63, at 48, 50-51.
144Decision No. 57, art. 32.
145 Decision No. 57, art. 31. See notes 86-87 supra and accompanying text for a
discussion of the lists of exceptions.
14 6Decision No. 57, art. 30. Decision No. 84, Bases Para una Politica Tecnol6gica
Subregional, was promulgated by the Commission at its Extraordinary Session in
June 1974. It appears as an appendix to Grupo Andino, No. 36 (June, 1974).
14 7Decision No. 70 of February 1973, art. 27. Interestingly, the article also
specifies that the plan may be approved by a two-thirds vote of the six-member
Commission, and no negative vote, consistent with Acuerdo, supra note 2, art. 11, b).
148Decision No. 70, art. 28.
1491d. art. 29.
15Od. art. 30.
15 1For the difficulties in negotiating the automotive and petrochemical SPID,
the next two priorities for the Junta, see Andean Times of 17 May 1974 at 8-9
(automotive), of 24 May 1974 at 7-9 (petrochemicals), of 19 April 1974 at 7-8
(automotive and petrochemicals), and of 26 April 1974 at 12 (automotive).
152The authors owe the words "mystique and conjecture" to Dr. Felix Pefia of
INTAL, who used them in a conversation with Professor Furnish in May, 1973.
153See Proceedings, ABA Institute on Latin American Law, New York, May 3-4,
1973.
1 54 See Grupo Andino, No. 38, at 3-5 (August, 1974). As this issue points out,
some feasibility studies were not submitted on time but are forthcoming under time
extensions.
155The Atlas Copco Andino agreement is described in Grupo Andino, No. 31
(January, 1974), No. 33 (March, 1974), and No. 38 (August, 1974). The Andean
Times of 8 March 1974, at 3-4, also has an evaluation of the project.
'S 6Quoted in Grupo Andino, No. 38, at 5 (August, 1974).
